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I. Introduction
The following is an update on Texas’s case law and legislative activity
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 2016.
II. Case Law
A. Title and Conveyancing
1. Hysaw v. Dawkins 1 (Will Construction; Fixed vs. Floating Royalty)
Ethel Hysaw (“Ethel”) had three children, and devised her land in Karnes
County, Texas to them. Each child was given a tract (each differing in size)
in fee simple; however, as to the minerals,
[e]ach of my children shall have and hold an undivided one-third
(1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all oil, gas or other
minerals in or under or that may be produced from any of said
lands, the same being a non-participating royalty interest . . .2
Ethel’s will further provided that (1) each child “shall receive one-third
of one-eighth royalty, provided there is no royalty sold or conveyed by me
covering the lands so willed,” and (2) should there be any royalty sold
during the lifetime, then each child “shall each receive one-third of the
remainder of the unsold royalty.” 3
Some of the heirs believed a fixed one-twenty-fourth royalty was Ethel’s
intent because of the specific language “one-third of one-eighth.” Others
argued that a fixed fraction (multiplying the double fractions in Ethel’s
will):
(1) [was] discordant with will language, evincing an intent that
the siblings share royalties equally; (2) [added] language not
1. 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 5-6.
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found in the deed by inserting a fixed, single fraction of 1/24;
and (3) [created] disharmony among the provisions by mixing
fractional royalty interests with fractions of royalty interests to
produce unequal treatment of Ethel’s children.4
The trial court ruled that each child was entitled to a floating royalty (or
that the royalties should be divided equally); however, the appellate court
reversed, finding that each child was entitled to a fixed royalty, being a onetwenty-fourth royalty, with the excess to go to that sibling owning feesimple title to the subject tract.5
The Supreme Court first provided background on mineral interests and
the double-fraction dilemma, noting that “historical standardization” of the
one-eighth royalty will not alter clear and unambiguous language that can
otherwise be harmonized. 6 The Court went on to reiterate its commitment
to a holistic approach aimed at ascertaining intent from all words and all
parts of the conveying instrument and found that the appellate court erred
by analyzing each royalty provision in isolation instead of examining the
will language as a whole.7
The Court did not think that the size variations of the tracts conveyed to
each child indicated that Ethel favored one child over any other, but instead
considered “all the other language” in the four corners of Ethel’s will in
order to determine her intent. 8 The Court found that Ethel intended to treat
her children equally, and as such, the royalties should be equally divided
among them. In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically considered:
(1) The deliberate recitation of identical language to effect each
child’s royalty inheritance; (2) the use of double fractions in lieu
of a single fixed fraction . . . ; (3) the first royalty provision’s
global application to all the children and the second provision’s
language restating the royalty devise of each child individually;
and (4) the equal-sharing language in the third and final royalty
clause. 9

4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 6-7.
6. Id. at 9-10.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id. at 13-14 (noting that, although the daughters received larger sized tracts, the
intrinsic value of the land bequeathed to Ethel’s son is express).
9. Id. at 15.
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Further, the third royalty clause provided testamentary intent of equal
sharing between the children, as it provided that each child would “receive
one-third of the remainder of the unsold royalty.” 10
“When the terms of a mineral conveyance are in dispute, our objective is
to effectuate the parties’ intent as expressed within the four corners of the
conveyancing instrument.” 11 Looking beyond “a mechanical approach
requiring rote multiplication of double fractions,” the court considered “the
testatrix’s will in its entirety, [and held] that she intended her children to
share future royalties equally, bequeathing to each child a 1/3 floating
royalty, not a 1/24 fixed royalty.” 12
While this decision does not provide a bright-line rule or test, it does
provide instruction that a court will consider an instrument’s language as a
whole in order to deduce intent.
2. Wenske v. Ealy 13 (Deed Construction; Reservations and Exceptions)
In 1988, the Wenskes acquired a tract of land, subject to prior
reservations totaling a one-fourth nonparticipating royalty interest
(“NPRI”). In 2003, the Wenskes conveyed the property to the Ealys,
reserving a three-eighths mineral interest. The 2003 deed to the Ealys was
made subject to “Several Reservations and Exceptions to Conveyance and
Warranty ‘for all purposes,’” including the NPRI. 14 In 2011, both the
Wenskes and Ealys executed oil and gas leases. In 2013, the Wenskes
sought declaratory judgment declaring that the three-eighths interest they
reserved was taken “free and clear” of the NPRI. The trial court granted the
Ealys’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the NPRI burdened the
mineral owners proportionately. The appellate court affirmed. 15
On appeal, the Court examined both the 1988 and 2003 deeds, noting
that “the 1988 deed reserved…a royalty interest that is carved out of the
total production achieved under a mineral lease, [and therefore] is
considered a fraction of royalty or floating royalty.” 16 The Wenskes argued
that because the conveyance to the Ealys was made “subject to” outstanding
NPRIs, the Ealys should have borne the entire royalty, and the Wenskes’s

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 4-5.
No. 13-15-00012-CV, 2016 WL 363735 (Tex. App. Jan. 28, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4 (citing Medina Interests Ltd. v. Trial, 469 S.W. 619, 623 (Tex. App. 2015).
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interest should not be burdened by the NPRI. 17 The Court, however,
disagreed, stating that “because the 2003 Deed provides no guidance on this
apportionment…the default rule should apply: ‘Ordinarily the royalty
interest…would be carved proportionately from the two mineral
ownerships…’” 18
Further, the Court noted that the 2003 Deed did not ever mention
royalties, whereas the 1998 Deed clearly stated that the grantors reserve an
undivided one-fourth interest in the royalties produced from the land. 19 “A
deed will convey every interest held by the grantor except that which is
clearly reserved or excepted.” 20 Looking to this rule, the court disagreed
with the Wenske’s argument “that they could be unburdened by the NPRI
simply by stating in the 2003 Deed that they conveyed the property to the
Ealys ‘subject to’ the exception without even mentioning anything about
royalties or that portions of the royalty estate owned by Vyvjala and Novak
would be paid entirely by the Ealys.” 21
3. Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C. 22 (Deed Construction; Fixed vs.
Floating Royalty)
In 1978, Phillip sold 40 acres of land in Karnes County to the Leals,
excepting and reserving therefrom all minerals and royalties, but for “a onefourth non-participating royalty interest in and to all of the royalty paid on
production” to the Leals.23 Phillip later conveyed his mineral interest to
Cuanto Antes Mejor L.L.C., and entered into an oil and gas lease covering
152.2 acres, including the Leals’ forty acres. 24
A dispute arose between the Leals and Cuanto about how the one-fourth
royalty interest should be construed. Leal argued that the deed created a
fixed royalty in one-fourth of production. Cuanto argued that the interest
was a floating royalty interest, and as such, entitled them to one-fourth of
all royalty paid on production. The trial court held that it was a floating
royalty interest, and that the Leals were entitled to one-fourth of royalty. 25

17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957)).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id. (citing Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990).
21. Id.
22. Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C., No. 04-14-00694-CV, 2015 WL 3999034 (Tex.
App. Jul. 1, 2015).
23. Id. at *1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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The San Antonio Court of Appeals first provided a review of the canons
of construction, and provided specific examples in which a royalty has been
found to be “fixed” or “floating.” 26 The court construed the deed as a
whole, rather than separate terms and provisions, and upheld the trial
court’s ruling. 27
4. Dragon v. Harrell 28 (Deed Construction; Fixed vs. Floating Royalty)
In 1991, the Harrells conveyed ten acres of land to Dragon. The Harrell
deed was subject to prior reservations affecting the mineral estate, and
contained a new reservation in favor of Harrell, stating:
SAVE AND EXCEPT HOWEVER, and there is hereby reserved
unto the GRANTORS, their heirs and assigns, a free nonparticipating interest in and to the royalty on oil, gas and other
mineral in and under the hereinabove described property
consisting of ONE-HALF (1/2) of the interest now owned by
Grantors together with ONE-HALF (1/2) of the reversionary
rights in and to the presently outstanding royalty in on and under
said property, perpetually from date hereof. It being understood
and hereby provided, however, that GRANTORS, their heirs or
assigns, shall not be entitled to participate in the bonus money or
annual delay rentals paid, or to be paid, under any present or
future oil, gas and mineral lease on said premises, and that it
shall not be necessary for GRANTORS, their heirs or assigns, to
join in the execution of any future oil, gas or mineral lease or
leases on said premises. 29
In 2013, the Harrells filed suit against Dragon, arguing that the Harrell
Deed reserved a fixed fractional royalty interest, and as such, they were
entitled to one-half of total production of the oil and gas produced from the
premises conveyed. Dragon filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory
judgment that the Harrell deed “reserved a one-half (1/2) fraction of royalty
interest in the Property.” 30 The trial court granted the Harrell’s motion for
summary judgment, and Dragon appealed. 31
26.
27.
28.
2016).
29.
30.
31.

Leal at *2-3.
Leal at *4.
Dragon v. Harrell, No. 04-14-00711-CV, 2016 WL 1238165 (Tex. App. Mar. 30,
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id.
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It was undisputed that Dragon owned the mineral estate; the parties
disagreed on the meaning of the Harrell reservation. Dragon argued that
because “the [reserved] interest consists of ‘the royalty on oil, gas, and
other mineral[s],’ and not ‘all of the oil, gas, and other minerals,’ the
[Harrell] Reservation clearly creates a fraction of royalty.” 32 Dragon also
asserted that “the reserved interest comes out of ‘the royalty on oil, gas and
other minerals.’” 33 Harrell contended that its reservation “reserved a fixed
fractional royalty interest entitling [them] to…one-half (1/2) of total
production of the oil and gas produced from the Subject Land.” 34
The Court reviewed the Harrell reservation and found that it reserved a
“non-participating interest in and to the royalty” consisting of “the interest
now owned by Grantors” and “the reversionary rights in and to the
presently outstanding royalty.” 35 By reading the deed as a whole, the Court
concluded that the phrases mentioned referred to the prior reservations in
the deed, and thus, proper construction of the Harrell reservation required
an analysis of them.
The Harrell deed was subject to four prior reservations; however only the
first two were disputed and addressed by the Court. The first reservation
provided:
1. Mineral Reservation contained in, and herein quoted verbatim,
from a Deed of Conveyance to Claude D. Winerich, from Frank
A. Winerich and Ida Lee Winerich, dated February 17, 1940,
recorded in Volume 118, Page 615–616, of the Deed Records of
Karnes County, Texas, said reservation being as follows, to-wit:
“It is expressly agreed under this conveyance that the Grantors
hereby retain one-sixteenth (1/16th) or one-half (1/2) of the oneeighth (1/8th) of all minerals in, on and under said above
described 611 acres, said interest to be a participating interest.” 36
The second reservation provided:
2. An undivided one-fourth (1/4th) interest in and to all of the oil
royalty, gas royalty and royalty in other minerals reserved for the
natural life of C.D. Winerich and Dorice Winerich, and
contained in that certain Deed of Conveyance from C. D.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2-3.
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Winerich and Dorice Winerich to Frances W. Bowers, said Deed
of Conveyance being recorded in Volume 240, Pages 267–269,
of the Deed Records of Karnes County, Texas. 37
The Court found that the first reservation was a participating mineral
interest, including the right to develop, lease, and to receive bonus, delay
rentals, and royalty. 38 The second reservation created a life estate equal to
one-fourth of the royalties paid on any oil, gas, or other minerals
produced. 39 The Harrells acquired the reversionary estate, subject to the life
estate of Doris Winerich; therefore, they owned “15/16 of the mineral
estate, less a life estate in a one-fourth floating royalty interest, but with a
reversionary interest to that then-outstanding life estate royalty interest.”40
Thus, based on these two prior reservations, the Harrell grantors could
convey only the following: the fifteen-sixteenths of the mineral estate, less
a life estate in a one-fourth floating royalty interest, but with a reversionary
interest to that then-outstanding life estate royalty interest.41
In its analysis, the Court applied a holistic approach, and its primary
concern was to determine the parties’ intentions as expressed by the words
the parties used. 42 Further, the Court stated it would look at the four
corners of the instrument and read the instrument as a whole, not isolating a
single clause or phrase. 43
In analyzing the Harrell deed reservation, the Court stated “[t]he Harrell
reservation does not identify the interest as being in and to the oil, gas, and
other minerals; it unambiguously states it is an interest in the royalty on
those minerals.” 44 Further, the language makes clear that the royalty
interest was reduced by the prior reservations. 45 In examining the entire
deed with all of its words and parts, the Court held that the Harrell deed
reserved to the Harrell grantors a fraction of royalty interest, being one-half
of fifteen-sixteenths of whatever royalty is to be paid from the land.46

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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The analysis of the Court follows the Hysaw decision’s guidance that an
instrument’s language as a whole shall be considered to deduce the intent of
the parties.
5. Mueller v. Davis 47 (Property Descriptions; Statute of Frauds)
This case involved two deeds that did not contain a description of the
property conveyed. In Mueller, the court held that for a deed to satisfy the
statute of frauds, the description of the land must include information
regarding the size, shape, and boundaries of the land being conveyed, or
otherwise make reference to another instrument of record containing same,
such that the land conveyed can be identified with reasonable certainty, by
someone familiar with the area, to the exclusion of other property. 48
In 1991, Davis acquired two mineral deeds from Virginia Cope and
James Mills that lacked descriptions of the property conveyed. 49 The deeds
referenced “[a]ll of those certain tracts or parcels of land out of the
following surveys in Harrison County, Texas, described as follows,” and
provided a listing of parcels identifying acreage by quantity included in
what appeared to be oil and gas production units. 50 Additionally, the deeds
contained a “Mother Hubbard,” or coverall clause.
Mueller later acquired mineral deeds from Cope and Mills, Davis’s
grantors, which included the land previously conveyed to Davis. Mueller
sued, alleging that the deeds to Davis were void under the statute of frauds.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Davis. 51
On appeal, the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.52
The Court held that in order to satisfy the statute of frauds, a deed must
have a specific description of the land. In this case, description of the
acreage within a specific survey was not sufficient. 53 Furthermore, the
Court found that the Mother Hubbard clause was insufficient to rescue the
lack of a legal description, as the clause was only effective if the deed
contained a description adequate to identify specific property. 54 The Court
remanded for the lower court to decide what interests, if any, were
conveyed.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App. 2016).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 631.
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6. Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial 55 (Deed Construction; Fixed vs.
Floating Royalty)
Annie Trial, along with her eight children, owned 278 acres in Karnes
County, Texas. In 1949, she and six of her children sold their interests in
the land to the other two children, reserving “an undivided interest in and to
the 1/8 royalties paid the land owner upon production of oil, gas and other
minerals.” 56 Furthermore, the deed provided that all of the children would
share equally in the royalties. 57
Medina, as successor in interest to the purchasers, executed an oil and
gas lease with Marathon, and Medina and the Trials disagreed on what type
of interest had been reserved. 58 Medina argued that the deed reserved a
fixed royalty of 1/8, which would mean that each child held a one-eighth
interest in a one-eighth royalty. 59 The Trials disagreed, and argued that they
reserved a floating royalty of one-eighth of royalty. 60 The trial court agreed
with the sellers and found that the deed reserved a floating royalty interest
for each of the children.61
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court explained that
the usual royalty provided in mineral leases when the 1949 deed was
executed was one-eighth, and reasoned that the deed reference to “the 1/8
royalty” was based on the erroneous assumption that a landowner’s royalty
would always be one-eighth. 62
The Court noted that there was not a lease in place at the time the deed
was executed, and found that the use of the phrase “the 1/8 royalty” should
be construed to mean whatever future royalty interest a lessor might obtain
in a future lease, whether that be one-eighth or a different fraction. 63
Additionally, the deed referenced “royalties paid to the landowner,” which
the court believed suggested a floating royalty interest. Finally, the Court
reasoned that because the lease repeatedly stated that royalties would be
shared equally between the eight children, this was further evidence that the
parties intended to create a floating royalty. 64
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Medina Interests v. Trial, 469 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App. 2015).
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 625-26.
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B. Leases
1. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hyder 65 (Deduction of PostProduction Costs)
Chesapeake acquired the Hyder Family lease covering 948 acres in the
Barnett Shale. The lease provided for “‘a perpetual, cost-free (except only
its proportion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%)
of gross production obtained’ from directional wells drilled on the lease but
bottomed on nearby land.” 66 Since the Hyders’ lease was not pooled with
the producing land, the overriding royalty was created as inducement for
the grant of surface use rights.67 The lease also contained a clause stating:
“Lessors and Lessee agree that the holding in the case of Heritage
Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank shall have no application to the terms and
provisions of this Lease.” 68
Chesapeake deducted costs incurred in transporting, marketing, and
selling the gas from the overriding royalty. The Hyders brought suit,
arguing that their overriding royalty should be based on the sale price of the
gas without any deduction of post-production costs. 69 The trial court ruled
that the post-production costs had been improperly deducted, and awarded
the Hyders $575,359.90. 70 On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
affirmed. 71
The Texas Supreme Court interpreted its ruling in Heritage Resources,
Inc. v. NationsBank, in which the Court held that although a royalty is
“usually subject to post-production costs, including taxes…and
transportation costs…the parties may modify this general rule by
agreement.” 72 Chesapeake argued that the phrase “cost free overriding
royalty” was synonymous with the accepted definition of an overriding
royalty, in that some are free of production costs, but generally bear their
share of post-production costs. The Court rejected this argument largely on
its finding that since the lease allowed the Hyders to take their overriding
royalty in kind, they would have done so free of post-production costs.
Additionally, Chesapeake argued that the lessors had the right to take the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2016).
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Hyder, 427 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. App. 2014).
Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 483 S.W.3d at 872.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

324

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 2

overriding royalty in kind, and had they done so, they might have incurred
lower post-production costs than that of the lessee.73 The majority ruled that
“‘cost-free’ in the overriding royalty provision includes post-production
costs.” 74
In his dissent, Justice Brown, along with three other justices, took issue
with the majority regarding the cost-free language of the overriding royalty
only referring to post-production costs. 75 The dissenters noted that even
though the general rule is that the language references post-production
costs, parties commonly intend for the royalty interest to be free of
production costs. 76 Thus, the dissenters did not think that the cost-free
language expressed “an intent to abrogate the default rule that the lessee
bears post-production costs.” 77
The majority also noted that production taxes are not always postproduction costs and that parties “often allocate tax liability on the royalty
owners while at the same time specifically emphasizing that the royalty is
free from production costs.” 78 The dissenters, unlike the majority, did not
find that the reference to production taxes supported the Hyders’ argument
that “cost-free” means free of post-production costs. 79
2. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Vaquillas Unproven Minerals, Ltd. 80 (Retained
Acreage Clauses)
Conoco and Vaquillas were parties to two oil and gas leases.81 Both
leases contained retained acreage clauses setting forth the number of acres
surrounding each producing or shut-in gas well that Conoco was entitled to
retain after its continuous development program ended. 82
The retained acreage clause in each lease provided that after Conoco's
continuous drilling program ended:
Lessee covenants and agrees to execute and deliver to Lessor a
written release of any and all portions of this lease which have
73. Id. at 875.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 877.
76. Id. at 878.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 879.
80. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Vaquillas Unproven Minerals, Ltd., No. 04-15-0066-CV,
2015 WL 4638272 (Tex. App. Aug. 5, 2015).
81. Id.
82. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss3/22

2016]

Texas

325

not been drilled to a density of at least 40 acres for each
producing oil well and 640 acres for each producing or shut-in
gas well, except that in case any rule adopted by the Railroad
Commission of Texas or other regulating authority for any field
on this lease provides for a spacing or proration establishing
different units of acreage per well, then such established
different units shall be held under this lease by such production,
in lieu of the 40 and 640–acre units above mentioned.83
Conoco drilled several producing gas wells and assigned 640 acres to
each. 84 After Conoco would not release 600 acres that were assigned to
each gas well, Vaquillas brought suit, alleging that because of a Railroad
Commission field rule, Conoco breached the retained acreage clause. 85 The
trial court ruled that Conoco was only entitled to retain forty acres per
well. 86 Conoco appealed.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Railroad
Commission did adopt a field rule applicable to the lease.87 The field rule
states:
Rule 2. No well shall hereafter be drilled nearer than FOUR
HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN (467) feet to any property line,
lease line or subdivision line and no well shall be drilled nearer
than ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (1,200) feet to any
applied for, permitted or completed well in the same reservoir on
the same lease, pooled unit or unitized tract. 88
The rule does not expressly provide for a specific number of acres per
well, but, Railroad Commission Rule 38 states that if the spacing rule is
467-1200, as is the case here, then the acreage requirement shall be forty
acres for both oil and gas wells. 89 The retained acreage clause in the lease
did not contain an exception that limited the field rule to a maximum
number of acres assigned to a well, but did contain an exception, which
stated that if the field rule provides “spacing or proration establishing

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3.
Id.
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different units of acreage per well,” a well would hold only the acreage
provided for in that rule. 90
The Court found that the retained acreage clause in each of the leases
included an exception requiring that if field rules were adopted providing
for spacing or proration units of a different size in terms of acreage, then
the field rules would control. In this case, the established spacing that
provided for forty acres per well, as opposed to 640 acres per gas well. 91
3. XOG Operating, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Exploration Limited
Partnership 92 (Assignments; Retained Acreage Provisions)
XOG Operating assigned several leases covering approximately 1,625
acres to Chesapeake for a primary term of two years and “as long thereafter
as operations…are conducted upon [the leased premises] with no cessation
for more than sixty (60) consecutive days.” 93 The agreement provided that
“[a]fter the expiration of the Primary Term…all rights under this
[assignment agreement]…shall terminate, and said lease shall revert to
Assignor, except as expressly provided in Article IX.” 94 Article IX states, in
pertinent part:
Upon expiration of the Primary Term of this Assignment ... this
Assignment and all rights created hereunder shall terminate as to
all lands and depths covered hereby. Said lease shall revert to
Assignor, save and except that portion of said lease included
within the proration or pooled unit of each well drilled under
this Assignment and producing or capable of producing oil
and/or gas in paying quantities. The term ‘proration unit’ as used
herein, shall mean the area within the surface boundaries of the
proration unit then established or prescribed by field rules or
special order of the appropriate regulatory authority for the
reservoir in which each well is completed. In the absence of such
field rules or special order, each proration unit shall be deemed
to be 320 acres of land in the form of a square as near as
practicable surroundings [sic] a well completed as a gas well
producing or capable of production in paying quantities.... Upon
termination or partial termination of this Assignment and the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
480 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App. 2015).
Id. at 22.
Id.
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rights created hereunder, Assignee shall promptly provide
Assignor with a fully executed and recordable release of this
Assignment. . . . 95
The assigned acreage was subject to a field rule that provided for a
prescribed proration unit of 320 acres.96 Additionally, the rule required that
any unit containing less than 320 acres be considered a “fractional proration
unit.” 97 During the primary term, Chesapeake drilled six producing wells
and assigned fractional proration units for each well.98 The six units totaled
802 acres. 99
XOG brought suit, alleging that the wells only retained the 802 acres and
that the remaining 823 acres reverted to XOG. 100 In response, Chesapeake
argued that the parties intended for Chesapeake to retain the acreage
prescribed by the field rules, and as a result Chesapeake was entitled to
retain all of the acreage assigned to it.101 The trial court ruled in favor of
Chesapeake, and the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed. 102
On appeal, the Court found that the retained acreage clause specified that
the acreage retained by the assignee and excluded from reversion is the
“proration unit” of each well. 103 The Court applied the Railroad
Commission field rules and established that each unit in question comprised
320 acres in size. 104 Ultimately, the Court held that when Chesapeake
assigned “fractional proration units” to its wells, the meaning of the
assignment was not modified. 105
4. Aycock v. Vantage Fort Worth Energy 106 (Cotenancy; Effect of
Ratification)
Pannill, Desdemona and the Aycocks owned undivided mineral interests
in 1,409 acres in Erath County, Texas. In March 2008, Desdemona leased

95. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 25.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Id. at 28.
104. Id. at 29.
105. Id.
106. Aycock v. Vantage Fort Worth Energy, No. 11-13-00338-CV, 2015 WL 1322003
(Tex. App. Mar. 20, 2015).
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its interests to Vantage for $750 per net mineral acre, resulting in a bonus of
$394,574.60. In September 2010, when the Aycocks learned of the
Desdemona/Vantage lease, they sought to lease their interest with Vantage.
Vantage never responded, no well was drilled, and in 2011, the Desdemona
lease expired. 107
In May 2012, the Aycocks sued Vantage for unpaid bonuses, claiming
that their September 2010 letter constituted a lease ratification, and as such,
they were entitled to $750 an acre for their mineral interest in the leased
tract. The Aycocks also asserted that Vantage improperly leased the entire
property from Pannill and Desdemona. The trial court denied the Aycocks’
claims, and granted Vantage’s motion for summary judgment. 108
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Aycocks had
no basis on which they could make a claim against Vantage for unpaid
bonuses. 109 The Court noted that a cotenant can rightfully lease its
undivided interest without joinder from the other cotenants. 110 If a lessor
leases all of the common property, the cotenants are left with two remedies
– they can either (1) ratify the lease and request an accounting for all profits
received by the leasing cotenant, or (2) refuse to ratify the lease and collect
the value proportionate to their share of the minerals, less reasonable
production expenses. 111
The Court also discussed other ways unleased mineral cotenants could
ratify leases, including filing suit, executing and accepting a royalty deed,
and/or executing a conveyance that recognizes the lease.112 If an unleased
cotenant ratifies a lease, the unleased cotenant may sue the lessor cotenant
for all of the money received by the lessor cotenant in the form of lease
benefits that are attributable to the unleased cotenant’s share of the common
land. 113
The Aycocks claimed that Vantage was unjustly enriched by the bonus
payments that were made to Pannill and Desdemona and not to the unleased
cotenants. 114 The Court stated that Vantage was not unjustly enriched

107. Id. at *1.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. at *1 (citing Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 187 S.W.3d 201, 213 (Tex. App.
2006)).
111. Id. at *2 (citing Tex. & Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Kirtley, 288 S.W. 619, 624 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926); Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965).
112. Id.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *3.
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because it did not profit at the expense of the unleased cotenants, as
Vantage only made bonus payments to Pannill and Desdemona based on
their net acreage. 115 Furthermore, the Court held that the Aycocks could
only recover bonus money from Pannill and Desdemona, and not Vantage,
since owners of undivided interests are tenants in common. 116
5. KCM Financial, L.L.C. v. Bradshaw117 (Executive Duties)
Betty Lou Bradshaw (“Bradshaw”) inherited an undivided one-half (1/2)
non-participating royalty interest (“NPRI”) in 1773 acres in Hood County,
Texas. 118 The language reserving the NPRI mandated that any future
royalty be “not less than” one-eighth, which was the usual royalty in 1960,
when the NPRI was created. 119 The non-participating royalty interest,
being non-executive in nature, entitled Bradshaw to an interest in the gross
production (the royalty interest), but did not include the right to negotiate
lease terms or to receive any delay rentals or bonuses.120
Steadfast Financial, L.L.C. (renamed KCM Financial) acquired the right
to purchase the land. In a 2006 deal, KCM and Range Production, L.P.
(“Range”) agreed to have KCM sell the land to Range, reserving the
minerals, and to lease the mineral estate to Range. The lease provided for a
one-eighth royalty and a bonus of $7,505 per acre, totaling more than
$13,000,000 for the portion of the property burdened by Bradshaw’s
interest. 121
Bradshaw sued both KCM and Range, alleging that KCM violated its
fiduciary duty to her as the non-executive interest holder because the
customary royalty rate for leases in Hood County at the time of the KCMRange lease had increased to one-fourth. 122 Bradshaw argued that KCM
engaged in self-dealing by negotiating an above-market bonus payment at
the expense of a lower royalty. 123 Bradshaw further asserted that Range
conspired with and aided and abetted KCM’s breach. 124 KCM argued that

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015).
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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there was no breach because it obtained the minimally acceptable royalty
and it was the “same” for both the executive and non-executive. 125
The trial court dismissed Bradshaw’s claims, holding that neither KCM
nor Range had breached any duty or obligation owed to her. The case came
before the Texas Supreme Court on the issue of whether evidence existed
from which a jury could conclude that KCM breached a duty to Bradshaw
in negotiating the terms of the mineral lease.126 The Court remanded
Bradshaw’s claim against KCM for trial, but it dismissed her case against
Range.
When determining whether the executive breached its duty to the nonexecutive, the court looks to “whether the executive engaged in acts of selfdealing that unfairly diminished the value of the non-executive
interest.” 127 In this case, the court found that Bradshaw’s claim that the
executive misappropriated a shared benefit and converted it into a benefit
only for itself would constitute self-dealing if it was proven that the
executive acted with the intent to diminish the value of the shared
benefit. 128 The court declined to create any bright-line rule that “merely
obtaining the minimally acceptable royalty discharges, as a matter of law,
the executive’s duty.” 129 Rather, the court stated that in analyzing the
executive’s duty, the transaction must be viewed as a whole, which requires
a review of all of the terms of the lease. 130
In finding that, while “failure to obtain a market-rate royalty does not, in
and of itself, constitute a breach of [the executive’s] duty,” the court
reasoned that there was at least some evidence to support Bradshaw’s
allegation that the mineral lease was the product of self-dealing. 131 The
court, therefore, affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment as to the breach of
duty claim finding that summary judgment was not proper because a fact
question existed. 132
In holding that Bradshaw’s derivative liability claims against Range
failed as a matter of law, the Court determined there was no evidence that
Range was complicit in the alleged breach of duty or otherwise had any

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
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duty to Bradshaw in its dealings with KCM.133 Range, as lessee, engaged in
“nothing more than a typical business transaction.” 134 The Court agreed that
“in negotiating with the executive, a lessee should not fear liability for
doing nothing more than getting a good deal closed.” 135 The Court held that
even if KCM was found to have breached a duty owed to Bradshaw, its
liability cannot be imputed to Range as a matter of law and, therefore,
rendered judgment in favor of KCM.136
In summary, the court reaffirmed that “[a]n executive owes a duty of
utmost good faith and fair dealing to a non-executive,” and may not engage
in self-dealing. 137 The court declined to rule that a below-market royalty
rate, in itself, constitutes a breach of that duty. 138
C. Industry Agreements
1. Anderson Energy Corporation v. Dominion Oklahoma Texas
Exploration and Producing Company 139 (Joint Operating Agreement Not
Limited to Interest Owned at Time of Execution)
In 1980, Perlman and Sun Gas (“Sun”) entered into an agreement under
which Perlman assigned to Sun an undivided 50% working interest in
certain Eagle Ford-area oil and gas interests.140 The parties entered into a
drilling program whereby Sun could earn additional interests by
participating in additional drilling, and a joint operating agreement (“JOA”)
to cover all operations under the agreement. 141 The JOA included
a preprinted preferential right to purchase provision and a typewritten area
of mutual interest (“AMI”) agreement, supported by a plat depicting the
boundaries of the AMI. 142
Thereafter, Anderson Energy Corporation (“Anderson”), successor to
Sun and Dominion Oklahoma Texas Exploration and Production Company
(“Dominion”), acquired Perlman’s interest.143 Dominion drilled numerous
gas wells within the described AMI agreement, and then sold its interest to
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 74.
469 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App. 2015).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 284-85.
Id.
Id.
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HighMount without first presenting the offer to Anderson as required by the
JOA. 144 Without offering Anderson any right to participate, HighMount
acquired additional interests in the area. 145 Before the sale was completed,
Anderson filed a breach of contract suit against Dominion (and other
Dominion entities in the chain of title).
Before the sale was completed, Anderson filed a breach of contract suit
against Dominion (and other Dominion entities in the chain of title).
Anderson alleged that the JOA was breached when Dominion (and its
entities) acquired numerous interests and drilled more than 100 wells in the
AMI without providing Anderson notice or the opportunity to participate. 146
Additionally, Anderson claimed that the preferential right was violated
when HighMount acquired the properties from Dominion, since Anderson
was not given any option to acquire the interests.147
HighMount responded by arguing that the JOA only covered those
interests owned by the parties upon execution of the JOA, and,
therefore, the AMI and preferential right could not be breached in
relation to the after-acquired properties. 148 HighMount also claimed that
the JOA had already terminated, or the claims were precluded by waiver or
laches because Anderson failed to honor or assert rights under the JOA. 149
The San Antonio Court of Appeals relied on the “four corners” rule
when it reviewed the JOA sections referencing the contract area. 150 The
Court disagreed with HighMount’s argument that numerous portions of the
JOA were in present tense, and, therefore, the JOA must be read as
including only the interests owned by the parties at the time that the JOA
was executed. 151 It reasoned that various clauses within the JOA suggested
that the contract included oil and gas leases, as well
as “lands.” 152 Similarly, Exhibit A to the JOA identifies the “Contract
Area,” and defines it as the “Land and Leases” and “Initial Wells” to be
developed and operated under the JOA. 153 The Court reasoned that the
inclusion of “land” in addition to “leases” showed that the contract area was

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 285-86.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 291.
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intended to cover the initial leases and wells, as well as the unleased lands
described in Exhibit A. 154
The Court held that the parties to the JOA intended to include interests
acquired by them, or by their successors, in the future, within the lands of
the contract area subject to the JOA. 155 Additionally, the Court found that
the contract area must include subsequently acquired interests in order to
give the AMI effect 156 and held that AMIs, by definition, are intended to
cover future acquisitions. 157
In determining the JOA’s duration, the Court held that because there was
not a specified term in the JOA, the JOA’s term was for a “reasonable
time.” 158 The Court did not address what constitutes a “reasonable time,”
but remanded the issue to the lower court. 159
2. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation v. TRO-X, L.P. 160 (Lease
Termination)
The Cooper family executed five leases with TRO-X. 161 TRO-X
assigned the leases to Eagle Oil & Gas Co. (“Eagle”), but retained a
reversionary interest providing it with a “back-in” option to receive five
percent of its original working interest.162 The “back-in” option also applied
to “renewal(s), extension(s), or top lease(s) taken within one year of
termination of the underlying interest.” 163 Eagle subsequently assigned its
interest to Anadarko, who began drilling operations. 164
The Coopers later sent Anadarko, Eagle’s assignee, a demand letter,
claiming that the leases had been breached for failure to timely drill offset
wells as required. 165 Anadarko “determined that it had, in fact, breached the
Off-Set Well Provision, and that Cooper’s written demand automatically revested the leased mineral interests back into the Coopers.”166 Anadarko
negotiated new leases with the Coopers and agreed to release the old leases,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 291-92.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 292-94.
Id. at 294.
No. 08-15-00158-CV, 2016 WL 1073046 (Tex. App. Mar. 18, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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but called the old leases “existing leases” in the negotiations.167 The new
leases were executed and recorded in June of 2011. The releases were
executed later in June, but not recorded until August of 2011.168 TRO-X
was not informed of the new leases, nor did it consent to the releases. The
new leases used the same form as the original TRO-X leases, but changed
the length of the primary term, required a larger bonus, and imposed a 240day continuous drilling commitment. 169
TRO-X sued Anadarko, seeking to exercise its “back-in” option,
claiming that the new leases were top leases.170 The trial court ruled in
favor of TRO-X, but the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed and rendered
judgment in favor of Anadarko. 171 The main issue, as framed by the Court,
was whether the delay between the execution of the new leases and the
release of the old leases evidenced the Coopers’ intent that the new leases
were top leases, which could only come into being upon the recording of
the releases. 172
The Court noted that TRO-X bore the burden of proving that the Coopers
intended to top-lease, and held that they failed to provide enough evidence
to support such a conclusion. 173 The Court instead found that the delay
between the execution of the new leases and release of the old leases did
not evidence an intent to top-lease, and that a “lessor is deemed to have
waived any formal surrender requirements if it signs a new lease with the
intent to terminate the old one.”174
The effect of the Court’s ruling was to wash-out TRO-X’s back-in. This
case continued the general practice in Texas precluding washouts in cases
involving bad faith or a breach of a fiduciary duty, but allowing them,
unless strictly forbidden by the terms of the agreement.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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D. Regulation of Drilling and Production
1. Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Limited Partnership 175 (TXRRC Filings
Do Not Constitute Constructive Notice)
Charles Hooks leased his property in Hardin and Jefferson counties to
Samson Lone Star Limited Partnership (now known as Samson Lone Star
L.L.C. (hereinafter “Samson”)). 176 The Jefferson County lease contained
provisions that required Samson to prevent drainage from wells drilled on
adjacent lands, and further provided that if a gas well was completed within
1,320 feet from the leased tract (the “buffer zone”), Samson was required to
either: (1) drill an offset well, (2) pay compensatory royalties, or (3) release
the offset acreage. 177 The lease did not allow for pooling. 178
In 2000, Samson began drilling a well (BSM 1) on a tract adjacent to the
Hooks’ lease. 179 Although the drillsite was outside the buffer zone, the well
was directionally drilled so that the bottom was within 1,320 feet from the
leased property. 180 Samson provided Hooks a copy of a reconfigured plat
that showed the bottom hole location to be outside the buffer zone. Samson
filed the plat with the Texas Railroad Commission in December of
2000. 181 In 2001, Samson sought to amend Hooks’ lease and pool 50 acres
of it into the BSM 1 unit. 182 Based on the plat he was previously provided,
Hooks agreed to the pooling, executed the required documents, and was
sent royalty checks. 183
Hooks later discovered that the well bottomed inside of the lease’s
buffer-zone and filed suit against Samson in 2007, alleging fraud, among
other claims. 184 Specifically, Hooks alleged that Samson made false
representations concerning the location of the well’s bottom to avoid paying
compensatory royalties that accrued before the unit was formed. 185 Hooks
also claimed that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to its claim

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

457 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2015).
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 56.
Id.
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should not apply since Samson had fraudulently induced Hooks to believe
that the BSM 1 well was 1,400 feet from Hooks’ lease. 186
The trial court found that Hooks could not have discovered the true facts
within the limitations time period. 187 Thus, Hooks had additional time to
file the suit, and the jury awarded Hooks approximately twenty-one million
dollars in damages. 188 Samson appealed, and the appellate court reversed,
finding that the statute of limitations barred Hooks’ claims because Hooks
should have known that the BSM 1 well bottomed within his lease’s bufferzone when Samson proposed pooling. 189 Hooks appealed to the Texas
Supreme Court.
The Court upheld the trial court’s ruling, holding “when the defendant’s
fraudulent misrepresentations extend to the Railroad Commission record
itself, earlier inconsistent filings cannot be used to establish, as a matter of
law, that reasonable diligence was not exercised.”190 The Court found that it
was up to the jury to determine whether Hooks used reasonable diligence
because reasonable diligence is a question of fact, not law. 191
Ultimately, the Court held that there was some evidence to support the
jury’s finding that the Hooks were delayed in bringing the claim because of
Samson’s fraud. 192 The Court stated that when fraudulent documents are
part of the public record, a mineral owner is entitled to rely on them, even if
there are other public records that contradict the fraudulent documents.193
The Supreme Court remanded the case to consider the merits of Hooks’
claims.
2. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Gulf Energy Exploration
Corporation 194 (Liability for Improper Plugging)
This case arises out of the Railroad Commission’s orders requiring
American Coastal Enterprises (“ACE”) to plug abandoned, inactive offshore wells. 195 ACE owned a number of inactive offshore wells in the Gulf
of Mexico. In March 2008, the Texas Railroad Commission ordered ACE

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 60.
482 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2016)
Id. at 562.
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to plug the inactive wells, but in May 2008, ACE declared bankruptcy. 196
As a result, the Commission assumed the plugging responsibilities, and
Superior Energy Services was awarded a contract to plug eight of the ACE
wells, two of which were at issue in this case. 197 About a year prior to the
service contract, Gulf Energy Exploration (“Gulf”) acquired a lease that
encompassed eight of the inactive wells, and requested the Railroad
Commission’s approval to begin reworking operations some of them. 198
After Gulf’s request, representatives from Gulf, ACE, and the
Commission met to discuss the abandoned wells, and orally agreed that the
Railroad Commission would delay plugging four of the eight wells.199
Furthermore, the parties agreed that Gulf would post a bond and apply to
take over operations of the four wells no later than June 12, 2008.200 Soon
thereafter, the agreement was reduced to writing in the form of a “formal
Settlement and Forbearance Agreement.” 201 Despite the agreed upon terms,
one of the four wells that Gulf was to operate was plugged between the time
that the oral agreement was reached and the written agreement was
executed. 202 After obtaining legislative consent, Gulf brought suit against
the Railroad Commission for breach of contract and negligence.203
The trial judge ruled that the parties had entered into a binding oral
contract. 204 The Railroad Commission disagreed with the trial judge’s
ruling, and also with the judge’s instructions to the jury because the
instructions did not include a question on contract formation, nor did they
include a question as to whether the Railroad Commission acted in good
faith when plugging the well.205 The jury ruled in favor of Gulf, and
awarded $2,500,000.00, the maximum amount permitted by legislative
consent. 206 The Railroad Commission appealed, and the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals affirmed. 207

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
2014).

Id. at 563.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 571-72.
Id.
See R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 480 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

338

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 2

The Commission appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the Texas
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 208 The Court looked
to Texas Natural Resources Code Section 89.001 and found that a state
agency that regulates natural resources is protected if the agency acts in
good faith. 209 Although the evidence did not establish conclusively that the
Commission acted in good faith in plugging the wrong well, a jury could
reasonably infer that a Commission representative made a mistake as to
which four wells were to be plugged, or a jury could reasonably infer that
there was a clear discrepancy between the well that was to be plugged and
the well that was improperly plugged. 210 Because the Commission’s good
faith argument was an issue of fact, the Court held that the question should
have been submitted to the jury. 211
As to the contract issue, the Railroad Commission argued that a fact
issue existed as to whether the contract was entered into when the parties
met, or when the formal written document was signed, and as such, this
issue should have been submitted to the jury. 212 The Court agreed with the
Railroad Commission, and found that the evidence submitted at trial raised
a valid issue as to whether the parties reached a binding agreement at their
meeting. 213 Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that a contract based on the
oral agreement was formed because the issue should have been submitted to
the jury. 214
Finally, the Court held that the issue of the Railroad Commission’s good
faith in plugging the well also should have been submitted to the jury. 215
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial
court. 216
3. Sciscoe v. Enbridge Gathering (North Texas), L.P. 217 (Trespass by
Airborne Particles)
In this case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that airborne particles
can constitute trespass. 218 From 2005 to 2009, various operators constructed
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.3d at 562.
Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id. at 576.
No. 07-13-00391-CV, 2015 WL 3463490 (Tex. App. June 1, 2015).
Id. at *8.
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natural gas compressor stations and a metering station, collectively referred
to as “the Ponder Compressor Station.” 219 The sites were within a half-mile
of DISH, which is a residential community in Denton County, Texas. 220
Beginning in 2005, the property owners complained to the operators of
excessive noise and offensive odors, but were “assured the smell was
merely an odorant and no harmful gases or pollutants were being
emitted.” 221 Three years later, other property owners contacted the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) about the noise and odor
coming from the Ponder Compression Station, claiming that the activities
were causing the residents to experience nausea and headaches. 222 TCEQ
conducted an investigation, but could not confirm the nuisances. 223
The property owners hired an environmental and sampling firm to
investigate their claims. 224 The firm’s report detected benzene, xylene,
yethyl benzene, toluene, and other substances in the air surrounding the
residential neighborhood.225 In March 2010, TCEQ “installed and began
operating AugoGC Monitors to record hourly air samples of regulated
volatile organic compounds (VOCs)”. 226 TCEQ determined that the
operators’ facilities were within emission limits. 227
The property owners filed suit in 2011, alleging that the noise and
emissions from the operators’ facilities created a public and private
nuisance and also that the chemicals in the air constituted trespass.228 The
operators separately moved for summary judgment. 229 The trial court
granted the summary judgment without giving a basis for its decision.230
On appeal, the main issue was whether property owners could seek
damages over a decrease in property values due to trespass of light, noise,
and airborne chemical particulates that originated and crossed over from the
operators’ facilities. 231 The operators asserted that the migration of
particulates did not constitute trespass because as a matter of law, trespass
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
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requires a physical entry and a significant deposit of chemical particulates
on property. 232
The Court of Appeals relied on Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust to analyze the trespass cause of action. 233 The Texas Supreme
Court has recognized invasions of airspace as a trespass. 234 Trespass occurs
when a physical entry that is not authorized has occurred on the surface of a
property or in the adjacent airspace of a property. 235 An “invisible trespass”
can become a cause of action if there is an actual injury caused.236
Because the Court could not hold as a matter of law that trespass did or
did not occur, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings on
whether a migration of airborne particulates originating from the operators’
facilities can constitute trespass.237 Although the Court did not rule on
whether airborne particulates can constitute trespass, the Court
acknowledged that trespass may occur if an operator intentionally and
voluntarily allows particulates to enter another’s property and those
particulates caused injury. 238
E. Litigation
1. Titan Operating, L.L.C. v. Marsden 239 (Nuisance; Quasi-Estoppel)
The Marsdens purchased their home near Aledo, Texas in 1997. It was
located on the northwest side of a 6.2-acre tract in a residential
neighborhood. 240 In 2004, they executed an oil and gas lease to Sullivan. 241
The lease contained a well-setback provision that provided that “no well
[could] be drilled within two hundred (200) feet of any residence or
barn…” without consent from the lessor. 242 Another provision gave the
lessee the right to access the leased premises to reach drilling sites and

232. Id. at *7.
233. Id. at *8 (examining Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1,
11 (Tex. 2008)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at *7.
236. Id. at *8.
237. Id. at *12.
238. Id. at *9.
239. Titan Operating, L.L.C. v. Marsden, No. 02-14-00303-CV, 2015 WL 5727573 (Tex.
App. Aug. 27, 2015).
240. Id. at *1.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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other related operations on adjacent land,243 and an addendum to the lease
provided that:
[The Marsdens] and [Sullivan] agree that no drilling or other
activities will be conducted upon the surface of [the Marsdens'
property] and that no roads, pipelines, tanks, heaters, separators,
injection wells, or other surface equipment will be placed on [the
Marsdens' property] without the prior, written consent of [the
Marsdens. [B]ut [Sullivan] shall have the right to prospect, drill,
and produce oil and gas from beneath the surface of [the
Marsdens' property] by operations which it may conduct on
adjoining or nearby lands through the drilling, operating, and
maintaining of directional wells located on the surface of such
adjoining or nearby lands. 244
The Marsden lease was eventually assigned to Titan Operating, L.L.C.
(“Titan”). 245 Titan decided to place its drillsite on the land immediately to
the North of the Marsden’s property, the southwest corner of which was
approximately 176 feet north of the Marsdens’ house, with the actual well
sitting 300 feet from the Marsdens’ house. 246 Five additional wells were
drilled north of the Marsdens’ property. 247 The Marsdens complained of
noise from the drilling and operations, and claimed to not have been able to
sleep or enjoy their house. 248
The Marsdens brought suit for nuisance and sought damages based on
the loss of enjoyment of their property as well as the decrease in property
value. 249 The jury found that Titan Operating deliberately created a private
nuisance and that the Marsdens were not estopped from bringing a nuisance
claim. 250 The jury awarded the Marsdens $36,000 (being $18,000 to Marcus
Marsden and $18,000 to Laura Marsden). 251 Titan filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asking the trial court to disregard the
jury’s decision, but the trial court denied the motion. Titan appealed.252

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on
the grounds that the affirmative defense of quasi-estoppel should have
resulted in a directed verdict for Titan.253 Quasi-estoppel applies when it
would be “unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position
inconsistent with the one to which he acquiesced or from which he accepted
a benefit.” 254 For this affirmative defense to apply, “the party being
estopped must have had knowledge of all material facts at the time of the
conduct on which the estoppel is based.” 255
In this case, the addendum to the Marsden lease specifically gave the
lessee “the right to prospect, drill, and produce oil and gas from beneath the
surface of [the leased premises] by operations…on adjoining or nearby
lands through the drilling, operating, and maintaining of directional wells
located on the surface of such adjoining or nearby lands.” 256 The Court
found that Marcus Marsden “recognized that the terms of the bargain that
he struck in his lease were that drilling could not occur on his property but
that the southeast corner of his property could be used to travel to a drilling
site and that drilling could occur on adjoining land.” 257 During lease
negotiations, the Marsdens had the opportunity to negotiate for larger
setback provisions, but did not. There were no allegations of negligence by
Titan, nor was there any evidence that Titan violated any laws or
regulations in drilling its wells.258 Furthermore, the Marsdens accepted
royalties from the well, which was pooled with a portion of their land. 259
Because the Marsdens “unconscionably accepted benefits of transactions…
while taking positions that inconsistently attempt[ed] to avoid the
obligations and effects (including all of the circumstances forming the
gravamen of their nuisance claim) of those same transactions,” the Court
held that as a matter of law, quasi-estoppel barred the Marsdens’ claim of
nuisance against Titan. 260

253. Id. at *9.
254. Id. at *7 (citing Little v. Delta Steel, Inc., 409 S.W.3d 704, 711 (Tex. App. 2013).
255. Id. (citing Nash v. Beckett, 365 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. App. 2012); Lindley v.
McKnight, 349 S.W.3d 113, 133 (Tex. App. 2011).
256. Id. at *8.
257. Id. at *9.
258. Id.
259. Id. at *10.
260. Id.
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2. Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corporation 261 (Nuisance; Negligence;
Causation)
In 2010, the Cernys leased the minerals underlying their one-acre tract in
Karnes County, Texas to Marathon Oil Corporation’s predecessor. 262 The
lease authorized Marathon to use the surface of the Cernys’ land, but
Marathon has not placed any wellheads or infrastructure on it.263 The
Cernys’ lease was pooled with other leases as part of the Brysch-Adams
Unit. The Unit contains three wells.264
In 2013, the Cernys sued Marathon and Plains Exploration for private
nuisance, negligence, gross negligence and negligence per se, claiming that
noise, odors, and toxic chemicals from their oil and gas operations made the
Cerneys sick and damaged their property. 265 The district court granted
Marathon and Plains’ no-evidence and traditional summary judgment
motions. 266 The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the
evidence provided by the Cernys, “consisting of lay affidavits and nonmedical expert testimony” failed to present more than a scintilla of
evidence to support their claims. 267
The general rule in Texas is “that expert testimony is necessary to
establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge
and experience of lay persons.” 268 In this case, the Cerny’s petition only
sought recovery for nuisance symptoms typical of discomfort rather than
disease, and disclaimed “any ‘personal injury damages’ that would invoke
[the need for expert testimony under] Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner”;
therefore, they did not present medical expert testimony to prove causation
of their physical injuries. 269
The Cernys also relied on Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. in support of
their claim that medical expert testimony was unnecessary. 270 The Court
261. 480 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App. 2015).
262. Id. at 615.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 615.
266. Id. at 617.
267. Id. at 624.
268. Id. at 618 (citing Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. 2007)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 619. See also Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex.
1984) (providing an exception to the general rule requiring a medical expert on causation of
a medical condition, but applying only where “both the occurrence and conditions
complained of are such that the general experience and common sense of laypersons are
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rejected this argument and distinguished the facts of this case from those of
Morgan. The Court agreed with the defendants’ argument that “the Cernys’
nuisance and negligence claims are in the nature of toxic tort claims which
fall outside a lay person’s general knowledge and experience, and must
therefore be proven with expert testimony.” 271 “Plaintiffs seeking relief for
injuries of any nature caused by exposure to or migration of a toxic
substance must meet the stringent proof requirements imposed by the Texas
Supreme Court in Havner and its progeny.” 272 In Havner, the Court ruled
that:
expert testimony is necessary in a toxic tort case in order to
prove (i) the applicable standard of care, (ii) that the defendant’s
conduct more than doubled the risk, as shown by two
epidemiological studies, (iii) that the plaintiff’s injuries were
caused by the defendant’s conduct, and (iv) that the plaintiff’s
injuries were not caused by other possible sources. 273
For the Cernys’ claim that they became ill from the oil and gas
operations, the Court found that the Cernys suffered from chronic preexisting health conditions.274 For the Cernys’ property damage claim, more
specifically that their home had developed foundation damage, the Court
found that the home had foundation damage prior to when Marathon began
operations. 275 Furthermore, the Cernys failed to negate other possible
sources of chemicals other than Marathons’ operations, which prompted the
Court to hold that “an expert’s failure to rule out alternative causes of injury
renders the opinion unreliable, and legally constitutes no evidence.”276
In rejecting the Cernys’ nuisance claims for loss of enjoyment and use of
their land, the Court held that their claims resulting from dust, noise, traffic,
and foul odors were “too conclusory and speculative.”277 Further, the Court
of Appeals clarified that the causation standard for nuisance and negligence

sufficient to evaluation the condition and whether they were probably caused by the
occurrence.”)
271. Id. at 620.
272. Id.
273. Id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715-16, 20 (Tex.
1997)).
274. Id. at 622.
275. Id. at 621.
276. Id. at 622.
277. Id. at 625.
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claims based on noises, odors, and other exposures to oil and gas operations
is that an expert must rule out alternative causes of injury. 278
3. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore L.L.C. 279 (Subsurface
Trespass)
In this trespass case, the Court ruled that ownership of oil and gas does
not include the right to control other portions of the subsurface. 280
Anadarko leased the Chaparral Wildlife Management Area. 281 The area is
south of the Briscoe Ranch, which was leased to Lightning Oil
(“Lightning”). 282 Anadarko was required under the Chaparral lease to use
off-site drilling when “prudent and feasible.”283 To comply with this
requirement, Anadarko acquired a surface and subsurface agreement from
the Briscoe Ranch surface owner.284 The agreement authorized Anadarko to
place drilling rigs on the ranch property, and authorized Anadarko to drill
horizontal wells that would pass through the Briscoe Ranch lease and be
bottomed in the Chaparral lease.285
Lightening filed a trespass suit against Anadarko, alleging that it had the
exclusive right to decide who could drill the property. 286 The trial court
ruled in favor of Anadarko and Lightening appealed.287
After reviewing various cases 288 that dealt with a party’s ownership
rights in the subsurface of a tract where the mineral rights were severed
from the surface rights, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. 289 The
Court found that a party who owns the oil and gas rights does not own the
right to control other components of the subsurface.290 Instead, the owner of
278. Id. at 622.
279. 480 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. App. 2015).
280. Id. at 636.
281. Id. at 631.
282. Id.
283. See Lightening Oil Company v. Anadarko E & P Onshore, L.L.C., No. 04-1400152-CV, 2014 WL 5463956 (Tex. App. Oct. 29, 2014).
284. Lightening Oil, 480 S.W.3d at 31.
285. Id. at 636.
286. Id. at 630.
287. Id. at 632.
288. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Stephens City. v.
Mid–Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 295 (Tex. 1923); Villarreal v. Grant
Geophysical, Inc., 136 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App. 2004); Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 234
S.W.2d 389, 398 (Tex. 1950); Chevron Oil Co. v. Howell, 407 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966).
289. Lightening Oil, 480 S.W.3d 633-34.
290. Id. at 635.
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the surface estate owns the non-minerals beneath the surface.291 Therefore,
the Court ruled in favor of Anadarko and held that the surface owner of the
Briscoe Ranch could grant Anadarko permission to drill through the
subsurface to reach the Chaparral lease.292
4. Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd. v. Marathon Oil Company 293 (Property
Damage; Discovery Rule)
Marathon had a lease on a 20,000-acre ranch, where it plugged and
abandoned Well 812 in 1989. 294 Well 812 was used for a water flood
project until Marathon ceased all operations shortly thereafter.295 Ranchero
purchased the property in 2004. 296 In 2008, Aspen, a subsequent oil and gas
lessee, discovered that Well 812 was leaking a large amount of salt water
due to water injection nearby. 297 Furthermore, Aspen discovered that the
leak was due to the well’s improper plugging, which caused surface and
subsurface pollution and destruction.298
Ranchero filed a claim against Marathon, alleging that the leak had killed
vegetation on the property and decreased the property value by
$3,700,000.00. 299 Marathon moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Ranchero did not have standing because it was not the owner of the land at
the time of the alleged negligent plugging and that the suit was barred by
the statute of limitations. 300 The trial court granted Marathon’s motion for
summary judgment. 301 Ranchero appealed. 302
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. 303
The Court stated:
the well-established rule in Texas [is] that a cause of action for
injury to land is a personal right belonging to the person who
owns the property at the time of injury, and that a mere

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id. at 638.
488 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App. 2015).
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 366.
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subsequent purchaser does not have standing to recover for
injuries committed before his purchase. 304
In this case, Marathon’s negligent plugging occurred before Ranchero
owned the property and the salt water damage occurred after Ranchero’s
purchase; therefore, the Court found that Ranchero had standing to bring a
claim. 305
While Ranchero had standing to assert a claim, its claims were barred by
the two-year statute of limitations because the claim was filed more than
two years after Aspen discovered the leaking salt water.306 The discovery
rule did not toll the statute, since the damage from the salt water was not
inherently undiscoverable.307 “An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it
is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations
period despite due diligence.” 308
5. Cosgrove v. Cade 309 (Unambiguous Errors in Deeds; Notice;
Discovery Rule)
This case reiterates that mineral owners should carefully review their
deeds
to
ensure
that
mineral
reservations
are
properly
included. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “[p]lainly obvious and
material omissions in an unambiguous deed charge parties with irrebuttable
notice for limitations purposes.” 310 The discovery rule, which tolls the
statute of limitations until a party discovers the injury giving rise to the
claim, applies in limited situations where the nature of the injury incurred is
inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively
verifiable. 311 The statute of limitations begins to run when a deed is
executed and continues to run when a deed is properly recorded because it
is publicly available.312
Barbara Cosgrove (“Cosgrove”) purchased a two-acre tract from Michael
and Billie Cade (“Cades”) in 2006. 313 The deed, each page of which was
signed or initialed by the Cades, did not reserve the mineral rights, but the
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 366 (quoting S.V. v. R. V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1996)).
468 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2015).
Id. at 34 (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 35.
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Real Estate Contract’s “Special Provisions” clause stated: “‘Sellers to retain
all mineral rights.’” 314 A closing document prepared by the title company
required both parties “fully cooperate, adjust, and correct any errors or
omissions and to execute any and all documents needed or necessary to
comply with all provisions of the above mentioned real estate
contract.” 315 The parties did not dispute that “the deed mistakenly – but
unambiguously – failed to reserve the mineral rights.” 316
Prior to the sale, the Cades leased their mineral interests to Dale
Resources, L.L.C., and ultimately Chesapeake became the operator of the
lease. 317 In 2010, the Cades demanded a corrective deed from the
Cosgroves when Chesapeake alerted them to a “problem” with the deed’s
mineral reservation. 318 The Cosgroves refused, claiming that the Cades’
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.319 In 2011, the Cades sued
Cosgrove for a declaratory judgment that they were the owners of the
mineral interests. 320 In Texas, a four-year statute of limitations governs
deed reformation claims. 321 The trial court granted summary judgment,
finding that the Cades’ claims were time-barred. 322 The court of appeals
reversed, stating the discovery rule delayed the accrual of limitations for the
deed reformation claim. 323
Texas law provides for a rebuttable presumption that a grantor has
immediate knowledge of defects in a deed that result from mutual
mistake. 324 Since a grantor has actual knowledge that the deed is incorrect,
the limitations period on a claim to reform an incorrect deed begins as soon
as the deed is executed.325
The discovery rule, which tolls the statute of limitations until a party
discovers the injury giving right to the claim, applies in limited situations
where “the nature of the injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable and
the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable.” 326 Therefore, the Court
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. (citing Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 45 (Tex. 1971)).
Id.
Id. at 36.
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held where a deed is unambiguous, the “[p]arties are charged as a matter of
law with knowledge of an unambiguous deed’s material omissions from the
date of its execution, and the statute of limitations runs from that date.” 327
The parties have actual knowledge of what a deed includes and
excludes. 328 Where a reservation of rights, such as the Cades' mineral
reservation, is omitted from the instrument, “the presumption of knowledge
is irrefutable because the alleged error is obvious.” 329
Moreover, “obvious omissions are not inherently undiscoverable.” 330
Texas Property Code 13.002 puts all parties on notice, including the
grantor, of a deed’s contents. 331 Mineral interest owners must read and
inspect their deeds to ensure that their mineral interests are properly
reserved. 332 The Cades’ injury could not be deemed undiscoverable
because the deed was publicly available.333 “Section 13.002 establishes a
lack of diligence in the discovery of a mistaken omission in an
unambiguous deed as a matter of law.” 334 As the Court provided in Hooks
v. Sampson Lone Star, L.P., “(1) reasonable diligence includes examining
‘readily available information in the public record,’ and (2) ‘reasonable
diligence should lead to information in the public record.’”335 The Court
rejected the Cades’ claims, finding that they could not argue they acted with
reasonable diligence when they failed to notice a plain mistake when
executing their own deed, as the deed was readily available for inspection at
the time of signing and in the public records for the remainder of the
limitations period.336
The Court has now expressly found that the discovery rule does not toll
the statute of limitations where an unambiguous deed includes plainly
obvious and material omissions. 337 The statute begins to run at execution,
when all parties are put on notice.338 If a deed is properly recorded, Texas
Property Code 13.002 imposes notice on the grantor of the deed’s

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39 (citing Hooks v. Sampson Lone Star, L.P., 457 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. 2015)).
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 40.
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contents. 339 Therefore, mineral owners should be especially careful to
review deeds to ensure reservations are properly included.
III. Legislative Update
A. Transfer on Death Deeds 340
Effective September 1, 2015, Texas Estate Code Section 114.151 allows
for Transfer on Death Deeds. Lawmakers believe this provision will
provide a simplified process for the non-probate transfer of real estate.
A Transfer on Death deed operates the same as any other conveyance,
except that title does not pass to the grantee until the grantor’s death. The
property conveyed passes outside of the grantor’s estate. To be effective, a
Transfer on Death Deed must be signed, notarized, and recorded in the deed
records of the county where the property is located prior to the death of the
grantor. It may not be created through the use of a power of attorney. An
unrecorded Transfer on Death Deed is ineffective to convey property.
The statute permits the naming of alternative beneficiaries in the
Transfer on Death Deed; however, the statute does not permit a grantor to
convey under complicated distribution provisions or to several people in
varying percentages. If the grantor changes his or her mind, a Transfer on
Death Deed may be revoked by the filing of a “Cancellation of Transfer on
Death Deed” form or by the recording of a subsequently executed
conveyance of the same property. A Transfer on Death Deed may not be
revoked by a will.
B. House Bill 2207 341
Effective January 1, 2016, the general rule of “first in time, first in right”
no longer applies in the case of real estate mortgages and their priority over
subsequently filed oil and gas leases. House Bill 2207 creates a
legislatively imposed subordination of a prior mortgage to a subsequent oil
and gas lease. This legislation will result in savings in time, energy and
costs to producers that were previously required to obtain subordination
agreements from lienholders.
In the case where a lease is taken on land that is already subject to a
mortgage and the mortgage is foreclosed, the statute provides that the oil
and gas lease does not terminate, even if the lease has not been
subordinated to the mortgage. Under the bill, when the leased property is
339. Id.
340. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 114.151 (West 2015).
341. Tex. H.B. 2207, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015).
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later sold in a foreclosure sale, any rights granted to the lessee to use the
surface terminate, and any royalty payments which become due after the
sale pass to the purchaser of the foreclosed property.
The loss of surface rights will not likely be an issue on leases of smaller
tracts, but might become problematic on large tracts or tracts on which oil
and gas wells have been or are currently being drilled. For this reason, it
may still be advisable to obtain a subordination agreement from a
lienholder for tracts of land upon which surface operations are conducted or
contemplated.
C. House Bill 40 342
House Bill 40 confirmed the state’s exclusive jurisdiction to regulate oil
and gas operations. Additionally, the bill expressly preempts a municipality
or other political subdivision from regulating oil and gas operations.
Although the bill preserves a municipality’s authority to regulate
“aboveground activity” that relates to oil and gas operations, it does not
preserve any other political subdivision’s authority.
In regard to “aboveground activity,” a municipality can assert
jurisdiction over oil and gas operations if (i) it is commercially reasonable,
(ii) it does not effectively prohibit oil and gas operations conducted by a
reasonably prudent operator, and (iii) it is not otherwise preempted from
doing so by state or federal law. The bill lists examples of what constitute
“aboveground activity,” and includes fire and emergency response, traffic,
lights, noise, notice, and setback requirements.

342. Tex. H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015).
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